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Transnational Insolvencies Involving Enterprise Groups:
The Mixed Record of Protocols, the UNCITRAL Model
Insolvency Law, and the EU Insolvency Regulation
Anthony V. Sexton*

Abstract
That commerce has become internationalin scope is a fact known to all in the legal
community. Many large companies now have operating subsidiaries in a large number of
countries, and those countries have radically dierent legal regimes. The law of insolveng is no
different; indeed, the differences in legal regimes are ofparticularimport as insolveny law is
largely driven by jurisdictions' policy preferences on the relationsho between debtors and
creditors. But when international enterprise groups go bust, domestic bankrupty law is
incapable of handling the private internationallaw issues that are implicated. While there have
been efforts in recentyearsto bring harmony to the chaos, it is increasingly clear that the cument
framework cannot adequately address the problems encountered by transnationalenterprise
groups. This Comment explores the currentframework and proposes sensible first steps to
address the framework's shortcomings.
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I. INTRODUCTION TO ISSUES IN TRANSNATIONAL
INSOLVENCY
Insolvency is an incredibly complex area of the law and its practitioners
must be generalists. In addition to the procedural and substantive complexities
of the various insolvency regimes themselves, such cases involve a broad swath
of substantive issues in nearly every area of the law, including intellectual
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property, debtor-creditor, employment, environmental, and administrative
regulation, among others. The resolution of the substantive issues of law that
arise in the insolvency context is inextricably intertwined with difficult policy
considerations.' This web is difficult to penetrate even when an insolvent
company has operations in only one country or a handful of countries with
closely related legal and economic systems, such as members of the EU.
But the ever-increasing scope of the global economy has resulted in an
increasing number of companies that have operations in multiple countries. 2
Although best practice generally results in separately incorporated business
entities in each jurisdiction, separate incorporation generally does not lead to
independent operation.3 As a result, the insolvency of the Venezuelan subsidiary
in a corporate entity may lead to insolvencies of the US, Chinese, Singaporean,
Channel Islands, and French subsidiaries.4 Absent any framework for such

1

See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, et al, A Global View of Business Insolveng Systems 5 (Martinus Nijhoff
2010). According to Westbrook:
Insolvency law is often misunderstood as a sort of legal mortuary when in fact
it is a hospital where the assets and the expertise of a business injured by
management mistakes or the vagaries of the free market are recapitalized or
rechanneled to renewed productivity and social benefit. The insolveng process is
uniquely intertwined with many other aspects of a countj's laws. It is also the ultimate
scale in that the right of entrepreneurs, workers, and creditors must be
properly balanced if an economy is to reach its maximum potential.
Id (emphasis added).
Evan D. Flaschen, Anthony

2

J. Smits, and Leo Plank, Foreign Representatives in US Chapter 11 Cases:
Filling the Void in the Law of Multinational Insolvencies, 17 Conn J Intl L 3, 3-4 (2001). See also
Westbrook, et al, A Global View ofBusiness Insolveng Systems at 1-3.

3

See Janis Sarra, Overseght and Financingof Cross-BorderBusiness EnterpriseGroup Insolveng Proceedings, 44
Tex Intl L J 547, 547-48 (2008). A perfect example of this integrated business is Lehman
Brothers, which had separately incorporated business entities in multiple countries but which was
financially integrated. For an insider's perspective on the complex web that comprised Lehman,
see generally Lawrence G. McDonald and Patrick Robinson, A ColossalFailureof Common Sense: The
Inside StoU of the Collapse of Lehman Brothers (Crown 2009). Judge Peck, the bankruptcy judge
presiding over Lehman's US bankruptcy proceedings (the "core" proceedings under Model Law
analysis, meaning Judge Peck controls, to a large extent, Lehman's bankruptcy worldwide)
acknowledged the importance of retaining Lehman's pre-petition cash management system-and
honoring obligations thereunder-in an early order in the case. See In re Lehman Bros Holdings Inc,
2008 WL 4902202, *2 (SDNY Nov 6, 2008). The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy will serve as a
touchstone for this Comment and is discussed further below.

4

See Sarra, 44 Tex Intl L J at 547-48 (cited in note 3); Neil Desai, How Insolvent Multinational
Businesses Should Adjust to Congress's Creation: Chapter 15, 7 Houston Bus & Tax L J 138, 139-40
(2006). Desai states that:
[a] multinational firm [], operating like an octopus, can strategically spread its
tentacles and conduct business through its subsidiaries. Subsidiaries are located
around the world to accumulate market share, generate revenue, target
demographics, develop product lines, and gain brand recognition. With the
added layer of e-commerce, multinationals and their subsidiaries are operating
in a global arena that collapses commerce into one marketplace.

Winter 2012

813

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

transnational insolvencies, the value of the entire corporate enterprise would be
dragged down by the parochial rush to assets that would occur under the
independent insolvency regimes of each entity's "host" jurisdiction.'
Furthermore, because large transnational corporations frequently have a huge
number of internal transactions among members of the enterprise group that do
not represent true sales or purchases of services, knowing where in the corporate
enterprise any given asset really belongs is challenging for any individual
jurisdiction.' Avoiding the reduction of value that results from such a rush on
assets is at the heart of domestic insolvency regimes;' therefore, in order to
achieve the aim of domestic insolvency regimes, a transnational framework is
required.
The call for a transnational framework for insolvency is not novel, and
commentators have explored the issue in depth for nearly twenty years.' The
debate has often focused on whether the optimal framework for cross-border
insolvency should be grounded in "universality" or "territoriality."' Broadly, a
universalist approach attempts to unify cross-border insolvency proceedings into
one main case, while a territorialist approach acknowledges the primacy of
domestic law as applied to any entity incorporated within a particular sovereign
Id. Other commentators note that:
[t]he trend towards globalization has led to the emergence of corporations
whose business operations in various countries are closely interdependent. As
intercompany debt and intercompany guarantees are used to allocate money
within the conglomerate, the resulting web of intercompany obligations leads
to an interdependency that has potentially disastrous results when one of the
entities within the conglomerate becomes insolvent. Even an isolated
insolvency of one of the companies can trigger cross-defaults throughout the
corporate group.
Flaschen, Smits, and Plank, 17 Conn J Intl L at 3-4 (cited in note 2).
s

6

Tatiana V. Tkachenko, Legal Status of Bank Holding Companies (BHCs): US and European Bankruptiy
Issues, 19 J Bankr L & Prac 573, 573 (2010) (quoting Bryan Marsal, Lehman's chief restructuring
officer: "There need to be international standards when dealing with a global company that
collapses, otherwise, every country acts like 'Every man for themselves"').
See Sarra, 44 Tex Intl L J at 549-52 (cited in note 3). For a thorough explanation of transnational
asset tracing, see generally Felicity Toube, ed, InternaionalAssetTracing in Insolveng (Oxford 2009).
The topic is generally beyond the scope of this Comment, but when particularly salient asset
tracing issues are presented, this Comment addresses the legal questions without fully explaining
the mechanics.

7

See Westbrook, et al, A Global View of BusinessInsolveng at 2-3 (cited in note 1).

8

See, for example, Ian F. Fletcher, ed, Cross-Border Insolveng: Nationaland Comparative Studies (JCB
Mohr 1992).

9

See, for example, Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to MulinationalDefault, 98 Mich L
Rev 2276, 2277 (2000) (advocating a universalist approach); Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in
International Bankrupty: A Post-UniversabstApproach, 84 Cornell L Rev 696, 702-04 (1999)
(advocating a modified territorialist approach that acknowledges the shortcomings of universalism
and modified universalism).
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sphere.o Both of those categorical approaches have been essentially abandoned
in favor of "modified universality," an approach that, in theory, allows for
recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings whose effects reach across
borders, while still respecting the role of domestic law." While there were
historical efforts at treaties and conventions on cross-border insolvency, those
efforts resulted in minimal progress.12 After many years of intensive study, the
UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) promulgated the
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (Model Law) in 1997," and the EU
passed the EU Insolvency Regulations in 2000.14 Finally, Protocols, which are
essentially contracts between the principals" in cross-border insolvencies,
provide case-by-case solutions to the unique problems in this context."
These frameworks proved to have significant shortcomings, particularly in
the very large cases of the last several years involving enterprise groups. The
most notable example came in the ongoing Lehman Brothers insolvency. In the
Lehman case, courts in the US and Britain issued contradictory orders relating to
the disposition of a single set of assets." This conflict arose despite the fact that
10 See LoPucki, 84 Cornell L Rev at 699-702 (cited in note 9).
11

This Comment will not discuss the normative debate surrounding the three approaches; it is
enough to note that modified universality has carried the day, as evidenced by the Model Law, the
EU Regulations on Insolvency Proceedings, and the general backdrop of Protocols. See
Section II.B. For a more thorough discussion, see Bob Wessels, Bruce A. Markell, and Jason J.
Kilborn, InternationalCooperationin Bankruptq and Insolveng Matters 39-71, 111-12 (Oxford 2009).

12

Anne Nielsen, Mike Sigal, and Karen Wagner, The Cross-Border Insolveng Concordat: Princies to
Facilitatethe Resolution of InternationalInsolvencies,70 Am Bankr LJ 533, 534 (1996) ("Only a handful
of international bankruptcy treaties espousing a universality-based theory have been successful,
and, in these cases, the parties to the treaties usually have had close territorial ties and similar legal,
economic, and cultural traditions.").

13

General Assembly Res No 52/158, UN Doc A/RES/52/158 (1998) (Model Law).

14

Council Regulation 1346/2000, 2000 OJ (L 160).

15

"Principals" are the person(s) who control the assets of a business entity in bankruptcy-not the
court or administrative body in charge of administering the case. For example, in US law, the
debtor in possession or trustee either operates or liquidates the business. The nature and scope of
authority of principals vary widely among legal regimes. For a comparative study, see generally
Otto Eduardo Fonseca Lobo, ed, World Insolveny Systems: A Comparative Study (Carswell 2009).
See generally Paul H. Zumbro, Cross-Border Insolvenes and InternationalProtocols-An Imperfect But

16

17

Efeeive Tool, 11 Bus L Ind 157 (2010) (discussing Protocols).
Compare In re Lehman Bros Holdings Inc, 422 Bankr 407, 422-23 (Bankr SDNY 2010) (holding a
priority provision in a swap contract unenforceable under US bankruptcy law, resulting in
payment of the assets at issue to the Lehman estate, and acknowledging that the decision was in
direct conflict with an earlier decision from the English High Court), with PerpetualTrustee Co Ltd v
BNY Corp Trustee Serv Ltd, 2009 EWHC 1912 (Chanc July 28, 2009) (UK) (holding provision
enforceable under UK law, resulting in payment to alternate investors). Though only one claim
was at issue in this case, the ramifications were huge: the priority of $12 billion was at stake, with
many of these claims to be made in a cross-border context. See Karen Brettell, BINY Mellon Will
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all current best practices were in place to avoid such a problem: both countries
adopted the Model Law, there is an expansive Protocol in place, and Lehman is
being liquidated (which is a significantly less complex procedure than
reorganization in the transnational context because domestic law in many
countries is not designed to facilitate reorganization under the guidance of a
debtor in possession). Such failures are particularly likely to occur where the
"debtor" is a transnational enterprise group. This is because the frameworks in
place only adequately address the individual domestic entities that make up a
transnational enterprise group, without addressing the fact that the existence of
the transnational enterprise as a whole relies on the connections between the
disparate domestic entities." With the threat of additional cross-border
insolvencies on the horizon, further examination of the current shortcomings in
the framework is essential, particularly in the context of enterprise groups.
Although UNCITRAL Working Group V is working to address this significant
shortcoming in the current framework, current expectations are that its
recommendations will manifest only in the form of a legislative guide, not as an
amendment to the Model Law."
This Comment endeavors to provide a basis for future work in the area. In
Section II, I describe the operative points in the existing frameworks and
highlight the weaknesses in those frameworks. In Section III, I highlight a
particular recent failure of the framework: the issues regarding the Dante
Collateralized Debt Obligation (Dante CDO) in the Lehman bankruptcy. In
Section IV, I submit two approaches that would minimize Lehman-like failures
in the future: (i) greater use of substantive consolidation for the limited purpose

18

at
online
2,
2010),
Feb
(Reuters
Dante CDO
Ruling on
Appeal Lehman
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/02/us-mellon-bankofny-idUSTRE6113VP20100202
(visited Oct 11, 2011). Dante was a "special purpose vehicle" (SPV) in the Lehman investment
structure, and it will be discussed in more detail below. Before the US ruling could be appealed,
the parties settled; the UK Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's ruling. UK rulesfor investors in
online
27,
2011),
St
J
july
(Wall
Lehman
fight
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904888304576471613543605664.htmi
(visited Nov 12, 2011). Accordingly, the conflict between the two rulings was never resolved.
See, for example, Irit Mevorach, Towards a Consensus on the Treatment of Multinational Enterprise

19

Groups in Insolvency, 18 Cardozo J Intl & Comp L 359, 362 (2010) ("Although international
instruments for insolvency and cross-border insolvency have been devised, the issue of groups
was put aside, perhaps for later consideration. The issue may have been neglected because of the
complexity of the matter."); Wessels, Markell, and Kilborn, International Cooperation at 122-25
(cited in note 11) ("The [EU Regulations require] that any legal person in any Member State must
be considered separately-even if sole-shareholderor majority shareholder relationshps exist between some of
them--with regard to where the center of main interests is located.") (emphasis added); LoPucki,
84 Cornell L Rev at 706 (cited in note 9) ("Writers describing universalism nearly always assume
that the debtor is a single corporation conducting an independent business, Thus, they do not
address the common situation in which the debtor is a corporate group.").
See Mevorach, 18 Cardozo J Intl & Comp L at 363-64 & n 9 (cited in note 18).
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of applying the center of main interest test, and (ii) insistence by courts in
jurisdictions which have adopted the Model Law (Model Law Courts) that
adoption of a Protocol be a prerequisite to obtaining the procedural benefits
inherent in the Model Law. Section V concludes.
II. EXPLANATION OF THE CURRENT TOOLKIT:
PROTOCOLS, THE EU INSOLVENCY REGULATIONS, AND THE
MODEL LAW
A. Overview
As mentioned in Section I, the three primary frameworks in transnational
insolvency are Protocols, the EU Insolvency Regulations, and the Model Law."
All of these acknowledge and expand on the ancient principle of comity, which
has long played a role in private international law. 21 Protocols are adopted on a
case-by-case basis; as a result, they are simultaneously broader and narrower in
scope than the other frameworks. The EU Regulations speak both to solely
intra-EU insolvencies and to broader transnational cases where a substantial part
of the enterprise is based in the EU.22 Finally, the Model Law aims to apply to all
jurisdictions in transnational cases, but it is limited in its scope to those countries
who adopt its terms.
B. Protocols
Protocols represent both the earliest foray into organizing the judicial
proceedings in transnational insolvencies23 and the tool with the sharpest edge in
20

21

22

23

In addition, the American Law Institute (ALI) promulgated guidance for insolvency proceedings
involving the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries. Because the ALI's
guidance in this area has very limited application outside of the North American context, and
because this Comment seeks to focus on transnational insolvencies of a broader scope, the
NAFTA principles are not discussed.
See, for example, Donald Earl Childress III, Comity As Conflict: Resituating International Comiy As
Conflict of Laws, 44 UC Davis L Rev 11 (2010) (explaining the role of comity in US jurisprudence);
LoPucki, 84 Cornell L Rev at 704 (cited in note 9); Scott C. Mund, Note, 11 USC 1506: US Courts
Keep a Tight Rein on the PublicPolg Exception, But the Potential to Undermine InternationalCooperation in
Insolveng Proceedings Remains, 28 Wis Intl L J 325, 325 (2010) (noting that "the spirit of comity with
foreign courts" plays a role in the administration of transnational insolvency cases).
Given the expanding integration of the economic law and policy of EU member-states, the
insolvency of a company that operates and has assets only in the EU is very similar to a US
bankruptcy where a company has operations and assets in a number of states. For that reason,
this Comment focuses on those provisions of the EU Regulations that involve assets and
operations both within and without the EU.
See Evan D. Flaschen and Ronald J. Silverman, Cross-BorderInsolveng Cooperation Protocols, 33 Tex
Ind L J 587, 589-91 (1998) (discussing early Protocols, including the Maxwell Communication
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any given case, as they are negotiated to address debtor-specific issues. Two
commentators have defined Protocols as "essentially case-specific, private
international insolvency treaties."24 That overstates the case-Protocols are
more accurately seen as contracts between the various principals in an
insolvency case. Like any post-petition contract that touches on issues beyond
the normal operation of the debtor, that contract must be ratified by the court
overseeing the debtor's administration.2 5 There are two primary reasons why
definition as a "treaty" overstates the case: (i) protocols are not binding on the
courts, while a treaty would be; and (ii) each principal may refuse to adopt the
Protocol.26 However, Protocols still represent "[t]he mechanism most frequently
used to establish cross-border cooperation of business enterprise groups."2 7
Protocols now touch on issues related to procedural coordination, court-tocourt communication, and, in some cases, substantive issues-often in the form
of limited substantive consolidation.28
1. Sources of protocol provisions and the standard scope of protocol
provisions.
Significant work has been done in the area of determining best practices as
they relate to Protocols. 29 These best-practice reviews focus on advocating the
adaptation of the modified universalist approach to drafting Protocols and
examining provisions in precedent Protocols that proved effective. I note the
salient points from each below.
a) The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat. The International Bar Association
Section on Business Law's Committee J adopted the Cross-Border Insolvency
Concordat in 1996." The purpose of the Concordat is to establish best practices
in the drafting of transnational insolvency Protocols where assets are distributed
Corporation Protocol, which was the first Protocol of more than a bilateral nature, and noting
that the Maxwell case "appears to have been the first instance in which an English company in
administration was simultaneously engaged in a Chapter 11 case").
24
25

26

27
28

29
30

Id at 589.
See Sarra, 44 Tex Intl L J at 563 (cited in note 3) ("Protocols are usually negotiated by key parties
to the proceedings and then endorsed by the relevant courts with oversight of the proceedings.").
The impact of such a decision will be discussed in the context of the Lehman case. See Section
III.
Sarra, 44 Tex Intl LJ at 562 (cited in note 3).
See id at 562-72. Substantive consolidation is an insolvency term of art, which is related to-but
not necessarily the same as-the corporate law concept of piercing the corporate veil.
For a more thorough overview, see Zumbro, 11 Bus L Intl at 165-69 (cited in note 16).
International Bar Association Section on Business Law Committee J-Insolvency and Creditors'
Rights, Committee]. Cross-BorderInsolveny Concordat(International Insolvency Institute 1996), online
12,
2011)
(visited Oct
at http://www.casselsbrock.com/cb/pdf/IBA__.Concordat.pdf
(Concordat).
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in such a way that multiple main proceedings are needed.31 Ten principles are
laid out in the Concordat; the principles touch both on cooperation between
debtor-principals and on cooperation and communication between the various
courts involved in the process.32 The Concordat's aim of fostering inter-court
cooperation was particularly influential in the development of the Model Law.33
The ten principles of the Concordat34 are: (i) the case should be
administered in as few fora as possible (in other words, there should be a "main
proceeding"); (ii) non-local creditors should have equal access to the main
forum, but common rulings of the main forum should be respected in ancillary
fora; (iii) where there is more than one main proceeding, there should be equal
information sharing between debtor-principals and creditors; (iv) where there is
no main forum, payments and claims should be monitored by all parties to
ensure that double payments are not made due to lack of communication; (v)
ancillary proceedings should transfer remaining assets to main proceedings with
minimal procedural burden; (vi) debtor-principals should be able to employ all
the tools of the main forum, not merely those tools they would have access to in
their home jurisdiction; (vii) the debtor-principals should be allowed to exercise
the voiding-or avoidance-rules of any forum;" (viii) ancillary fora should be
able to invoke public policy limitations on the ability of debtor-principals to
invoke the substantive law of the main forum if such have only a limited
connection to the debtor's primary business, and courts should acknowledge
that debtor-principals are not necessarily subject to the jurisdiction of the main
proceeding; (ix) reorganizations should be allowed even if all main fora do not
generally allow for reorganization;36 and (x) proceedings should protect the ex
ante creditor expectations.
Of those principles, vii, viii, and ix have been the most difficult to
implement effectively, as they represent substantive, as opposed to merely
procedural, recommendations that lead to conflicts between the substantive laws

31

32

See Nielsen, Sigal, and Wagner, 70 Am Bankr L J at 557-58 (cited in note 12); Zumbro, 11 Bus L
Intl at 165 (cited in note 16).
See Nielsen, Sigal, and Wagner, 70 Am Bankr L J at 558-61 (cited in note 12).

33

See Ian F. Fletcher, Insolveng in Private Internationallaw: Nationaland InternationalApproaches 443-51
(Oxford 2d ed 2005).

3

See Concordat (cited in note 30). See also Nielsen, Sigal, and Wagner, 70 Am Bankr LJ at 543-57
(cited in note 12) (discussing the ten principles).

3s

This power, in particular, has led to significant conflict in all transnational insolvency frameworks,
and it will be discussed as a specific problem. See Section II.C.3; Wessels, Markell, and Kilborn,
InternationalCooperation at 184-85 (cited in note 11) ("The Concordat takes a controversial and
somewhat confusing stance with respect to the choice of law in avoidance actions, a stance that
only few later protocols would take.").

36

This is another primary problem, particularly in the enterprise setting.
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of different countries. Additionally, the commentary to the Concordat makes
clear that the drafters envisioned situations similar to early transnational
insolvencies, in which enterprise groups were essentially focused in a small
number of jurisdictions or were not highly integrated.17 Nevertheless, the
procedural principles of the Concordat-particularly its emphasis on
information sharing and equal access-were put into practice very early.38 The
procedural principles also generally lay the groundwork for the drafting of
modern Protocols,3 9 and they were highly influential in the drafting of the Model
Law.40
b) The ALT Guidelines for court-to-court communication.41 Although the
Concordat touched upon the topic of court-to-court communication, it was
primarily concerned with documenting prior best practices. As noted, the
Concordat's foray into cross-court communication was novel at the time.
Recognizing a need to improve further upon cross-court communication, the
American Law Institute (ALI) drafted the Guidelines Applicable to Court-toCourt Communications in Cross-Border Cases (Guidelines). 42 "The Guidelines
recognize that one of the most essential elements of cooperation in cross-border
cases is communication among the administrating authorities of the countries
involved." 43 The Guidelines are intended to overcome the difficulties involved
with court-to-court communications (particularly ex-parte communication
issues) and are drafted with the intent that they be formally adopted by the
courts involved before they are employed." The ALI recommends that the
37

38

39
40

41

42

See Concordat at Principle 1 Commentary (cited in note 30) ("In most cases, an enterprise will
have its nerve center and many of its assets in one country. In the usual circumstance that country
is the most appropriate forum for the administrative center of its insolvency."). But even in highly
integrated enterprise groups, significant operating decisions--and significant assets-will be
located in a large number of jurisdictions.
See, for example, In re Evefresh Beverages, Inc, 238 Bankr 558 (Bankr SDNY 1999) (applying
Concordat principles when determining whether to endorse a Protocol before the Concordat was
officially adopted).
See Zumbro, 11 Bus L Intl at 165-66 (cited in note 16).
Terence C. Halliday, Managing CorporateBreakdowns Across NadonalFroniers,2010 Norton Ann Rev
of Intl Insolvency Art 7, 151 ("UNCITRAL staked its singular claim for recognition of its
instrument on three grounds. It explicitly acknowledged its debt to what it had learned from prior
efforts, not least from MIICA and the Concordat produced by the IBA.").
The technical details of the ALI Guidelines are not explored in as much detail as the Concordat's
because the ALI Guidelines have (i) a more limited focus and (ii) are widely considered to be
uncontroversial in application.
ALI, Guidelines Appicable to Court-to-Court Communications in Cross-Border Cases (2003), online at
www.ali.org/doc/Guidelines.pdf (visited Oct 12, 2011).

43

Bruce Leonard, The Development of Court-to-CourtCommunications in Cross-BorderCases, 17 J Bankr L &
Prac 619, 622 (2008).

44

See id; Zumbro, 11 Bus L Intl at 166-67 (cited in note 16).
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Guidelines be adopted in concert with a Protocol; 45 in that sense, the Guidelines
have been successful, as they have been adopted wholesale "by no fewer than 18
separate Judges in twelve bankruptcy courts."4 6
c) The European Communication and Cooperation Guidelines. Most recently, the
European Communication and Cooperation Guidelines for Cross-Border
Insolvency (European Guidelines) 47 have been proposed as a supplement to the
EU Insolvency Regulations in an effort to assist the application of the EU
Regulations in transnational cases involving more than one main case.48 Such
guidelines were necessary because European Protocol practice is less developed
than US Protocol practice (that is, practice involving cases in which at least one
principal is located in the US). 4 9 The European Guidelines contain eighteen
principles for court-to-court communication that are specifically tailored to the
EU context, and they contain principles for communication and coordination
with the European Court of Justice (ECJ). However, notwithstanding their EUcentric nature, the European Guidelines have influenced Protocols involving
enterprise groups that include European operations but whose primary
operations are elsewhere.o
2. Expanding the scope
enterprise groups.

of Protocols

to address

transnational

Protocols have expanded significantly in scope over the last twenty years.
The early Protocols focused on situations where, even if the insolvency was
transnational in scope, the principal assets of the enterprise were focused in one

45
46

See Zumbro, 11 Bus L Intl at 167 (cited in note 16).
Leonard, 17 J Bankr L & Prac at 624 (cited in note 43).

47

European Communication and Cooperation Guidelinesfor Cross-BorderInsolvengy, International Association

48

of Restructuring, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Professionals of Europe (July 2007), online at
http://www.insol.org/INSOLfaculty/pdfs/BasicReading/Session/ 205/European%20Communi
cation%20and%20Cooperation%20Guidelines%20for/o20Cross-border%201nsolvency%20.pdf
(visited Oct 12, 2011).
See Zumbro, 11 Bus L Intl at 167 (cited in note 16).

49

50

See Wessels, Markell, and Kilborn, InternationalCooperation at 189 (cited in note 11). This is due, in
part, to the fact that the use of Protocols is generally more problematic in civil law countries
because of the lack of specific statutory authority to communicate with other courts and to adopt
a Protocol. See Leonard, 17 J Bankr L & Prac at 622 (cited in note 43).
See Zumbro, 11 Bus L Intl at 167 (cited in note 16) (noting that the Lehman Protocol, while
generally modeled on ALI and Concordat principles, also included elements of the European
Guidelines). This could be seen as part of a bid to make the principal of Lehman Brothers
International more likely to sign on to the Lehman Protocol. If that was the desired outcome, it
was unsuccessful.
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or two jurisdictions." The Protocols in those cases dealt generally with the rights
of parties asserting claims against the debtor: where creditors could file certain
types of claims; choice of law issues that could be agreed upon by the parties (as
opposed to choice of law issues requiring a judicial determination); certain intragroup settlement procedures; and so on.5 2 They involved only a limited number
of principals, and they did not purport to address issues of substantive law. 3
Although the Protocols were considered groundbreaking at the time of their first
use and led to the development of the Concordat (which influenced the drafting
of the Model Law), the scope of early Protocols was entirely inadequate to
address the "particularly vexing problems" of transnational entities.5 4
By contrast, more recent Protocols seek to address issues of a more
substantive nature, in addition to the traditional issues regarding court-to-court
communications and equal access." In particular, Protocols have attempted to
define the law of the case respecting avoidance actions" and priority schemes
(particularly respecting tort claims)" between third party creditors; the applicable
choice of law for certain classes of claims or classes of assets; and, perhaps most
importantly, limited substantive consolidation for the purposes of settling intragroup liabilities." In particular, the emphasis on limited substantive
consolidation and attempts to predetermine certain choice-of-law issues
represent an attempt to work through the issues relevant to transnational
insolvencies involving enterprise groups. Indeed, many of these evolutions are
51

See, for example, the Protocol in In re Maxwell Communications Corp, 170 Bankr 800, 802 (Bankr
SDNY 1994); Final Supplemental Order Appointing Examiner and Approving Agreement
Between Examiner and Joint Administrators, In re Maxwell Communications Corp, No 91 B 15741,
1992 Bankr LEXIS 2582 (Bankr SDNY Jan 15, 1992). Maxwell had nearly four hundred
subsidiaries in the UK, the US, and Canada, and it was organized as a UK-based holding
company. However, 80 percent of Maxwell's assets were tied to US subsidiaries. See Zumbro, 11
Bus L Intl at 163 (cited in note 16). See also In re Evefresh Beverages, 238 Bankr at 566 (cited in note
38) (operating assets only in the US and Canada); In re Nakash, 190 Bankr 763, 766 (Bankr SDNY
1996) (an insolvent Israeli bank under Israeli receivership with US assets).

52
53

See generally Zumbro, 11 Bus L Intl 157 (cited in note 16).
See Flaschen and Silverman, 33 Tex Intl LJ at 589-99 (cited in note 23).

54

See Zumbro, 11 Bus L Intl at 162 (cited in note 16).

5

See Sarra, 44 Tex Intl LJ at 560-62 (cited in note 3).

56

See generally Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Choice ofAvoidance Law in GlobalInsolvencies, 17 Brook J Intl
L 499 (1991).

57

See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Prioriy Conflicts As a Bamier to Cooperation in MulinationalInsolvencies,
27 Pa St Intl L Rev 869, 877 (2009).
See Sarra, 44 Tex Intl L J at 566-72 (cited in note 3). For example, the Lehman Protocol calls for

58

orderly settling of all intra-company claims with minimal judicial involvement and, importantly,
cancels intra-creditor claims below a certain threshold amount. These broad "Protocol powers"
were endorsed by Judge Peck in In re Lehman Bros Holdings Inc, 404 Bankr 752 (Bankr SDNY
2009).
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similar to the proposals of the UNCITRAL Working Group V, which is focused
on addressing shortcomings in the Model Law as it relates to transnational
insolvency.
3. Protocol shortcomings: recalcitrant principals and territorialist
concerns.
Protocols have proven to be incredibly powerful tools in cross-border
insolvencies. However, they suffer from two very basic-yet extremely potentflaws, which limit their usefulness in transnational insolvencies involving
enterprise groups: (i) hold-out principals, and (ii) territorial disagreements
regarding substantive law.
a) Hold-out prinatpals. First, although Protocols' utility may be obvious to
most parties, they essentially remain optional, private contracts between the
various principals. In the traditional Protocol context, where there are only a
limited number of principals, the transaction costs involved with drafting a
Protocol are minimal, particularly in light of the Concordat and ALI Guidelines.
Accordingly, holdout concerns are minimized; it is likely that all of the involved
principals will eventually sign on to a Protocol.
However, as the Lehman case demonstrated, where an enterprise that is
truly worldwide in scope enters insolvency, a large number of principals will be
involved. Moreover, where liquidation-instead of reorganization-is at issue,
some principals may decide that the terms of the Protocol are unfavorable, in
part because liquidations are zero-sum games: the creditors will not have any
opportunity to recover their claims based on the future operations of the
company, so anything in a Protocol that might reduce current recoveries will be
fought with more vigor. In the Lehman insolvency, the administrator for
Lehman Brothers International Europe (LBIE) refused to sign the Protocol,
citing concerns over how intra-company claims were to be handled, certain
attempts at determining choice of law analysis, and whether the Protocol could,
in fact, be effectively used in certain jurisdictions (particularly Singapore, where
many swap transactions were based). 9
b) Territoriality concerns. The Concordat and ALI Guidelines clearly adopt a
modified universalist stance toward the conduct of transnational insolvency.o
But these compilations of best practice cannot overcome basic differences in the
substantive law of forum jurisdictions. For example, Protocols that seek to allow

5

See Hilary Potkewitz, Lehman Bankrupty Hits Stumblng Block (Crain's New York Business.com Apr
89
28, 2009), online at http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20090428/FREE/9042 969
(visited Oct 12, 2011).

6

See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default: Chapter 15, the ALI
Prinples,and the EU Insolveng Regulation, 76 Am Bankr L J 1, 8-10 (2002).
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recognized principals to employ the transaction avoidance principles of all
jurisdictions (following the seventh Concordat principle) often purport to grant
a substantive right that would not otherwise exist because transaction avoidance
principles vary widely between jurisdictions." Protocols that acknowledge
"public policy" exceptions to the application of any particular provision lend
themselves to significant uncertainty: after all, divining the public policy of a
large number of jurisdictions-all with different legal systems, systems of
priority in insolvency, and constituency concerns-involves significant difficulty
and uncertainty.6 2 This is particularly true given that the insolvency systems in
many jurisdictions are far more heavily tilted toward a fast liquidation than the
US system, which often favors going-concern sales or reorganizations.63
These problems are particularly troublesome when a Protocol purports to
organize proceedings involving both civil and common law jurisdictions.64
Courts in civil law jurisdictions meticulously scour their civil codes for
authorization to engage in any practice, but because Protocols frequently interact
with rules limiting ex parte communications and communications between
courts, civil law courts have found their authority to endorse Protocols lacking.
As discussed above, many of the most beneficial aspects of Protocols require the
approval of the involved courts. Thus, if a civil law jurisdiction is important to
insolvency proceedings involving a transnational enterprise group (and such a
jurisdiction almost always will be), this basic problem can significantly limit the
beneficial nature of Protocols. This resulting limitation is particularly true
because the effectiveness of Protocols relies on the participation of all primary
principals, and if one principal is unable or unwilling to sign on, communication
and cooperation even between signatories to the Protocol will diminish. This
reliance on complete participation is essential because lack of cooperation will
make reorganization of the transnational enterprise essentially impossible.
jurisdictions and
Without cooperation between "liquidation-focused"
"reorganization-focused"
jurisdictions,
when
the
liquidation-focused
jurisdictions order the sale of assets that would be necessary to the survival of
the enterprise group as a whole, the entire group could be forced into
liquidation.

61

See generally Lobo, World Insolveng Systems (cited in note 15).

62

Problems that arise from the concept of public policy exceptions will be discussed in more detail
in connection with the Model Law. See Section II.C.3.
See generally Lobo, World Insolveng Systems (cited in note 15).

63
64

See Flaschen and Silverman, 33 Tex Ind L J at 593-94 (cited in note 23) (citing the Nakash
Protocol as the first Protocol to overcome the difficulties imposed by civil law regimes).

65

See id.
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C. The Model Law
The Model Law is widely heralded as the greatest achievement in the
development of transnational insolvency law and solidifies the primacy of
modified universalism." The text was adopted by UNCITRAL in 2007, and it
has since been adopted by eighteen countries, including several countries that
are particularly important in the global economy.67 However, notably absent
from the list of adopting countries are the majority of the EU countries, 68
Brazil, 9 and, perhaps most importantly, China.70 In connection with the
promulgation of the Model Law, UNCITRAL has also released guidance on
crafting domestic insolvency law that will function within the international
framework, 7 ' as well as a practice guide on cross-border insolvency that
emphasizes the interplay between the Model Law, domestic law in non-adopting
countries, and Protocols.72 Most recently, Working Group V has pre-released

66
67

68
69

See Fletcher, Insolveng in Private InternationalLaw at 446-51 (cited in note 33); Westbrook, et al, A
GlobalView ofBusiness Insolveng Systems at 246-50 (cited in note 1).
Australia, 2008; Canada, 2009; Colombia, 2006; Eritrea, 1998; Greece, 2010; Japan, 2000;
Mauritius, 2009; Mexico, 2000; Montenegro, 2002; New Zealand, 2006; Poland, 2003; Republic of
Korea, 2006; Romania, 2003; Serbia, 2004; Slovenia, 2007; South Africa, 2000; UK and Ireland,
2006; US, 2005. UNCITRAL, Status: 1997 - UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolveng,
online at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/insolvency/1997Model-status.html
(visited Oct 13, 2011).
As discussed below, the EU countries have their own framework, but the interaction between the
EU Regulations and non-EU countries is unclear, at best.
For a discussion of whether adoption of the Model Law would be appropriate for Brazil, which is
emerging as an important player in the world economy, see Fernando Locatelli, InternationalTrade
and Insolveng Law: Is the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-BorderInsolveng an Answer for Brail?,14 L
& Bus Rev Am 313, 344-45 (2008) (concluding that Brazil's current emphasis on territoriality in
cross-border insolvency cases may be hampering its competitiveness in the global economy). For
a general discussion of the current law on transnational insolvency in Brazil, see Paulo Fernando
Campana Filho, The Legal Frameworkfor Cross-Border Insolveng in Brazfl, 32 Houston J Ind L 97,
149-51 (2010) (noting Brazil's current territorialism and arguing for a need to move toward
modified universalism).

70

71
72

For a general discussion of China's insolvency law, see Rakhi I. Patel, A PracticalEvaluation of the
People's Republic of China's 2007 Enteprise Bankrupty Law, 10 UC Davis Bus LJ 109, 115-16 (noting
that "the 2007 law remains without a comprehensive cross-border bankruptcy proceeding to
assist foreign companies as the law requires that debtors have a domicile in China," but that the
law "makes an effort to recognize foreign bankruptcy proceedings and provides that foreign
parties may apply to the People's Court for recognition and enforcement of a bankruptcy
judgment made in a foreign court that involves debtor property located in Mainland China"). In
that sense, China's law is actually closer to the modified universalist framework than Brazil's,
though still with serious drawbacks.
UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Insolveng Law, UN Sales No E.05.V.10 (2005) (Legislative Guide).
UNCITRAL, Practice Guide on Crss-Border Insolveng Cooperation, UN Sales No E.10.V.6 (2010)
(Practice Guide).
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some guidance on the treatment of enterprise groups in insolvency. 73 I will
briefly explain the most salient points and shortcomings of the Model Law as it
relates to enterprise groups, 74 and I will note the insufficiency of Working
Group V's recommendations.
1. The Model Law's operating framework.
Ian Fletcher states that "[t]he four cornerstones of the Model Law can be
represented by four primary concepts: Access, Recognition, Relief, and
Cooperation."7 The Model Law purports to accomplish those goals by
facilitating: (i) recognition of foreign proceedings; (ii) information sharing
between involved courts and involved principals; (iii) equal access to all involved
courts for all principals, as well as for all parties with claims against a debtor; and
(iv) organization of cases where multiple main proceedings are taking place
involving a single debtor.
The Model Law contains a variety of built-in limitations on its scope. First,
Article 2 states that only certain kinds of foreign proceedings should be
recognized: to be recognized, a proceeding must be a collective proceeding
under the supervision of a judicial or administrative process (meaning that all of
the debtor's assets, and all claims against those assets, are on the table) and it
must be pursuant to a law relating to insolvency (not merely pursuant to general
creditor-debtor laws). Additionally, Article 2 limits the scope of which
principals are entitled to access: only foreign representatives receive the benefits
of the Model Law. Some interpretations of this language could lead to the
conclusion that "debtors in possession"-in other words, the management of
the company that was in place before the petition was filed-would not
However, given the importance of US proceedings in most
qualify.
transnational insolvencies, the US' strong public policy in favor of allowing
debtors in possession to remain in control of companies even if they are in
73

UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Insolveng Law, Part Three: Treatment of Enterise Groups in Insolveng
(pre-release, 2010), online at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/pre-leg-guidepart-three.pdf (visited Oct 13, 2011) (Enterprise Group Guide).

74

The Model Law has received significant scholarly attention, so a full discussion of its application
outside of the enterprise group context would be duplicative and unnecessary here. For a
discussion of the Model Law's application outside of enterprise groups, see Fletcher, Insolveng in
PrivateInternationalLaw at 443-57 (cited in note 33).

75

Id at 453.

76

See id.

7

See id. These points have been subject to some litigation; in particular, parties will often dispute
whether a proceeding is "collective" or "under a law relating to insolvency." See, for example, In
re Betcorp Ltd, 400 Bankr 266, 295 (Bankr D Nev 2010) (holding that Australian winding-up
procedure qualified as a foreign main proceeding).

78

See Fletcher, Insolveng in Private InternationalLawat 455-56 (cited in note 33).
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liquidation,79 and the US' wholesale adoption of the Model Law, such an
interpretation is implausible.
Most importantly, the Model Law draws a distinction between "main" and
"non-main" proceedings. Foreign main proceedings are the focal point of the
Model Law; generally, the substantive law of the foreign main proceeding should
guide the disposition of the debtor's assets." Article 20 of the Model Law
provides for a stay over all claims relating to a debtor when a foreign main
proceeding has been identified-essentially tying the hands of the domestic
court that recognizes the main proceeding. In order to qualify as a foreign main
proceeding, "the proceeding should be taking place in the State where the debtor
has the centre of its main interests."" The center of main interests (COMI) test
purports to gauge where a business conducts its primary operations.82 The
Model Law introduces a rebuttable presumption that the debtor's registered
office is the center of main interest,83 but the COMI concept, particularly in the
US, is a very fact-intensive inquiry. Courts in the US, applying the principal place
of business test that forms the bedrock of jurisdictional law in that country,84 do
not hesitate to find that a COMI is in a place other than that of registration.
Other courts rely more heavily on the Model Law's "site of registration"
presumption." These competing standards lead to the possibility of conflicting
rulings on the COMI issue, and because courts will only recognize as a main
proceeding cases based in the location of a business's COMI, the COMI
determination is at the heart of the Model Law framework.
Foreign non-main proceedings may be opened in any place where the
debtor has an "establishment," which is "any place of operations where the
debtor carries out a non-transitory economic activity with human means and
goods or services." Importantly, neither definition includes jurisdiction based
79

so

See, for example, A. Mechele Dickerson, Privatizing Ethics in Corporate Reorganiryations, 93 Minn L
Rev 875, 932 (2009) (explaining that the US bankruptcy code evinces a normative decision that
management-either original management or management installed by primary creditors pursuant
to contractual rights after default-is in the best position to guide an organization through
reorganization, even a liquidating reorganization).
See Fletcher, Insolveng in Private InternationalLax at 454-57 (cited in note 33).

82

Id at 457. See also Model Law, Art 2(b) (cited in note 13).
See Fletcher, Insolvency in Private InternationalLawat 457 (cited in note 33).

83

Model Law Art, 16(3) (cited in note 13).

84

86

See HertZ Corpv Friend,130 S Ct 1181, 1185-86 (2010).
See Alexandra CC Ragan, Comment, COMI Strikes a Discordant Note: Why U.S. Courts Are Not in
Complete Harmony Despite Chapter 15 Directives, 27 Emory Bankr Dev J 117,143-49 (2010).
As I discuss in more detail in connection with the EU Regulations, most European courts have

87

turned the ostensibly rebuttable presumption into a nearly controlling presumption.
Model Law, Art 2(f) (cited in note 13).

81

85
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solely on the transitory presence of assets," although Article 28 allows for
limited jurisdiction in such cases to facilitate the disposition of all the assets of
the debtor."
Upon the recognition of either a main or non-main proceeding, Model Law
Courts may grant any relief appropriate for ensuring the proper treatment of the
foreign proceeding." Article 21(1) includes an illustrative list of relief, which
includes a stay on proceedings or execution of assets, an evidentiary process, or
the grant of "any additional relief that may be available to" an office holder
appointed under the insolvency law of the enacting state." As Fletcher notes,
the final provision, in particular, may lead to situations where a principal may be
able to exercise greater powers under the law of the enacting state than it would
have been able to exercise under the insolvency laws of its own state.9 2 This is
particularly true in the areas of evidence-especially discovery-and the exercise
of avoidance powers. Accordingly, it is probably the provision most likely to
lead to the exercise of the public policy exception because it is bound up in
determinations of substantive law.
The Model Law does not purport to alter the domestic insolvency regimes
in enacting jurisdictions, and it provides for a public policy exception where
recognition of a foreign proceeding or a grant of access to domestic courts
would violate a fundamental public policy of domestic insolvency law.93
However, the Legislative Guide makes clear that the public policy exception
should be interpreted quite narrowly,9 4 particularly in light of Article 8 of the
Model Law, which provides that "[i]n the interpretation of the present Law,
regard is to be had to its international origin and to the need to promote
uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith."95

88

See Fletcher, Insolveng in Private InternationalLaw at 458 (cited in note 33).

89

See Model Law, Art 28 (cited in note 13).

90

Id at Art 21.

91

Id at Art 21 (1)(g).

92

See Fletcher, Insolveng in Private InternationalLawat 468 (cited in note 33).

93

See id. The public policy exception is located in Article 6: "Nothing in the present Law prevents
the court frorn refusing to take an action governed by the present Law if the action would be
manifestly contrary to the public policy of this State." Model Law, Art 6 (cited in note 13).

94

Legislative Guide at 311 (cited in note 71).

9s

Model Law, Art 8 (cited in note 13).
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It is important to note that the Model Law has no reciprocity requirement.
In other words, countries that adopt the Model Law will recognize the
proceedings of non-adopting countries.96
2. The application of the COMI standard as it relates to transnational
enterprise groups.
As noted above, the COMI standard is the driving force in the Model Law,
as the determination of the foreign main proceeding essentially guides the
remainder of the proceeding. However, the Model Law currently speaks only to
individual debtors-it makes no provision for enterprise groups. 7 In the
enterprise group context, then, operating subsidiaries with varying places of
registration are likely to have different COMIs under a traditional Model Law
analysis, particularly in Model Law Courts that employ a strong presumption
that a debtor's COMI is its place of registration. When combined with the
willingness of courts following the US model to give greater consideration to
operating realities, there are likely to be conflicting COMI findings with respect
to certain members of the enterprise group, and those findings may have little to
do with economic realities. One possible solution would be simply to allow
enterprise groups to elect a COMI in the incorporating or registering
documents, which would at least allow for certainty-and certainty, the
argument goes, is worth the forum shopping price one pays." Additionally, with
respect to jurisdictions whose COMI analysis turns on the place of
incorporation or registration, forum shopping is still readily available because
reincorporation on the eve of insolvency is feasible." But this analysis of forum
shopping understates the difficulties faced in reincorporating or reregistering
companies.100 Thus, the COMI issue remains a sticking point in the enterprise
context.
3. The "public policy" exception.
In essence, the public policy exception serves as a check on the kinds of
relief a Model Law court will grant. The Legislative Guide makes it clear that the
public policy exception should be read in conjunction with Article 8's clear
96

But some enacting states have included reciprocity requirements: South Africa, Argentina,
Mexico, Romania, and the British Virgin Islands. Mund, 28 Wis Int L J at 335-36 (cited in note
21).

97

See Westbrook, 76 Am Bankr L J at 8-10 (cited in note 60).

98

See Susan Johnston and John Han, A ProposalforParly-DeterminedCOMI in Cross-BorderInsolvencies of
MultinationalCorporate Groups, 16 J Bankr L & Prac 811, 814 (2007).

99

Id.

10

There are tax, regulatory, and contractual issues that come into play here that are outside the
scope of this Comment.
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statement that the overall aims of the Model Law-harmonization of
transnational insolvency proceedings-should be narrow in scope.'o' In the US,
the public policy exception has been sparingly employed.' 02 However, as
discussed in connection with the Lehman case study, a US court has found that
a violation of the US prohibition against ipso facto provisions would prevent the
court from respecting principles of comity.'O3 The court's discussion of such
specific public policy incongruities sidesteps the fundamental conflict that exists
between domestic insolvency systems that support reorganization and those that
do not. This fundamental conflict has never been specifically analyzed, and it
remains the "elephant in the room" of the public policy exception's relation to
enterprise groups. For example, would a US court recognize a UK ruling that
stripped assets located in the US from a UK subsidiary (where the US had
recognized the UK proceeding as a foreign main proceeding), if those assets
were necessary to the reorganization of an enterprise group with its COMI in
the US? On this point, the public policy exception and COMI determinations as
they relate to enterprise groups clearly conflict, and the current framework
provides no resolution.
4. Working Group V's recommendations on transnational enterprise
insolvencies.
Recognizing the shortfalls in the Model Law respecting transnational
enterprise groups, when Working Group V commenced work respecting
enterprise groups in insolvency generally, it also considered the insolvency of
transnational enterprise groups.1" Most importantly, Working Group V
considered whether substantive consolidation provides the answer to the
"Group COMI" question, but it ultimately abandoned the idea."' Accordingly,
"the Working Group eventually focused on facilitating coordination and
cooperation between courts (and representatives) handling insolvency
proceedings against different members of an enterprise group."' 6 In essence,
the Working Group recommendations amount to provisions that have proven
successful in Protocols involving court-to-court communication in large-scale

101 The Legislative Guide states: "The Model Law preserves the possibility of excluding or limiting

102

any action in favour of the foreign proceeding, including recognition of the proceeding, on the
basis of overriding public policy considerations, although it is expected that the public policy
exception will be rarely used." Legislative Guide at 311 (cited in note 71).
For a detailed analysis, see Mund, 28 Wis Intl LJ at 340-48 (cited in note 21).

103

See In re Lehman Bros Holdings, 422 Bankr at 412. See also Section III.

104

See Mevorach, 18 Cardozo J Intl & Comp L at 369-70 (cited in note 18).

105 See id at 409; Enterprise Group Guide at 65-67 (cited in note 73).
106

Mevorach, 18 Cardozo J Intl & Comp L at 415 (cited in note 18).
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enterprise groups. As such, they added little to the substantive framework of the
Model Law, and they are more similar to the Concordat or ALI guidelines. One
potential improvement that may result is that Model Law Courts in civil law
countries will see the Enterprise Group Guide, integrated as it is with the Model
Law, as implicit statutory authorization to engage in practices in which they were
unwilling to engage in before, such as communication with courts handling the
insolvencies of related entities in the enterprise group. However, that is a limited
benefit, at best.
5. Concluding remarks on the Model Law.
It is apparent from the above analysis that Working Group V has
essentially waved the white flag-at least for the time being-on addressing
head-on the problem of enterprise groups, even though it acknowledges that
such groups are "the most common form of business model."' Indeed, the
Working Group's recommendations simply reaffirm the application of Model
Law principles to enterprise groups, without purporting to suggest particular
methods for getting around the vexing problems inherent in the structure of
those groups.'os Many of the problems encountered can be attributed to
problems of entity law generally, not to transnational concerns.o' Accordingly,
Model Law Courts faced with the insolvency of enterprise groups continue
without guidance on many of the most important issues in transnational
insolvency.
D. The EU Insolvency Regulations
The EU Insolvency Regulations went into force in 2002, and they apply to
all members of the EU except Denmark."o Commentators widely agree that
their primary provisions were animated by the same modified universality
considerations that have driven the development of Protocols and the Model
Law."' Indeed, the primary difference between the EU Regulations and the
Model Law is the operative framework of the EU Regulations: specifically, the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) has authority to issue rulings that bind all
participating jurisdictions, which allows for harmonization on many of the

107

Enterprise Group Guide at 69 (cited in note 73).

108 See Mevorach, IS CardozoJ Intl & Comp L at 410-21 (cited in note 18).
109 See id.

110 See Micol C. Mion, An Analysis of the European Community Regulation on Insolveng Proceedings:Its Past,
Present and Future, 13 New Eng J Intl & Comp L 17, 18 (2006); Fletcher, Insolveng in Private
InternationalLaw at 444 (cited in note 33).
It1

See Mion, 13 New Eng J Intl & Comp L at 17-18 (cited in note 110); Edward
Territoriakty, 48 Colum J Transnatl L 401, 407 (2010).
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points of law-particularly, determination of COMI issues-when the domestic
courts applying the EU Regulations come to inconsistent results.112 The
decisions regarding the EU Regulations by the ECJ have proven persuasive to
courts seeking to interpret domestic versions of the Model Law."' Thus, to a
certain extent, the EU Regulations serve to harmonize all transnational
insolvency law involving large enterprise groups. Because most transnational
enterprise groups are likely to have assets in a European jurisdiction," 4 EU
courts are likely to apply EU Regulations law even in cases that involve non-EU
jurisdictions,"s and EU courts are ob/iged to apply the EU Regulations to
enterprises when the EU court determines the COMI is in an EU jurisdiction."'
The foregoing discussion is particularly significant in light of the fact that
the ECJ's decision in Eurofood IFSC Ltd"' draws a bright-line rule for COMI
issues: in the absence of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, a business's
COMI is its site of registration or place of incorporation."' While this bright-line
rule allows for a significant degree of control by the parties, it simply cannot
account for the reality that, in a business enterprise group, a subsidiary registered
in the Cayman Islands for tax purposes is likely to be controlled by an operating
company elsewhere. Put another way, current law under the EU Regulations
simply does not allow for any degree of substantive consolidation to determine a
COMI for business enterprise groups that reflects their economic reality. This is
in contrast to the willingness of US bankruptcy courts to consider more broadly
the COMI of the entire enterprise group. Therefore, the potentially unifying
application of the EU Regulations may lead to conflict with US interpretation of
the Model Law, and that conflict will lead to uncertainty and forum shopping."'

112

113

114

See, for example, the Eurofood case, where the ECJ issued its authoritative determination that
COMI, under the EU insolvency regulations, must be determined as of the date of the insolvency
petition. EurofoodIFSCLtd, Case 341/04, 2006 ECR I-3813 (2006).
See, for example, In re Betcorp, 400 Bankr at 289 (discussing the ECJ's Eurofood decision to
determine the COMI, under Chapter 15, of a company undergoing an administrative winding-up
in Australia); In re Ran, 607 F3d 1017, 1020-21 (5th Cir 2010) (discussing the connection between
the EU Regulations and analyzing EJC decisions in the Chapter 15 context).
See Mion, 13 New Eng J Intl & Comp L at 24 (cited in note 110) ("In today's global economy a
foreign creditor is probably unable to disregard the orders of a European Court since he/she is
likely to have assets or business in Europe and the company's officers from time to time might
travel there.").

115

See id.
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See id.

117

See Eurofood lFSC lid, 2006 ECR 1-3813.
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See Samuel L. Bufford, Center of Main Interests, International Insolveng Case Venue, and Equality of
Arms: The Eurofood Deision of the EuropeanCourt ofjustice, 27 Nw J Intl L & Bus 351, 357 (2007).
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See Mion, 13 New EngJ Int & Comp L at 24 (cited in note 110).
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E. Concluding Observations about the Existing Framework
The foregoing discussion makes clear that the current framework is
woefully ill-equipped to handle insolvencies involving transnational enterprise
groups. A high degree of conflict and uncertainty respecting the application of
the COMI principle to enterprise groups persists, even though Protocols, the
Model Law, and the EU Regulations all rely on a determination of COMI for
their procedural mechanisms.
Even if COMI can be accurately determined, substantive issues, which are
subject to vague public policy exceptions under the order-recognition regimes of
those frameworks, remain intractable. These include transaction-avoidance
mechanisms; priority schemes; the ability of former management to continue
operating the debtor as debtors-in-possession; the ability to engage in discovery
and other evidentiary issues that implicate the treatment of claims and valuation
of business assets; and, most fundamentally, business rescue or restructuring
regimes, in contrast to liquidation regimes. The main tools to address these
substantive issues are Protocols that include negotiation and arbitration
provisions aimed at settling substantive disputes, particularly substantive
disputes relating to intra-enterprise obligations. But such Protocols may be
ignored by principals seeking to maximize the return to their domestic
creditors. 120
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE: THE LEHMAN/DANTE
CASE STUDY
Discussion of the shortcomings of the current framework would be
needless if the framework was capable of producing generally coherent results.
Unfortunately, in the Dante CDO case the shortcomings of the current
framework all led to the worst conceivable result: a third party holding assets in
a custodial capacity was ordered to dispose of the assets in two different,
irreconcilable ways by courts in the UK and the US. 12' The amount of money
120

This, of course, involves a serious public choice issue: principals will always seek to maximize the
return to their domestic parties, so that the domestic parties seek that principal when a future
debtor enters insolvency. For a discussion of some of the public choice issues inherent in
bankruptcy practice, see generally Lynn M. LoPucki and Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public
Company Bankrupties in Delaware and New York: EmpiricalEvidence of a "Race to the Bottom," 54 Vand
L Rev 231 (2001) (evaluating empirical evidence that indicates that bankruptcy fora may
encourage forum-shopping by engaging in a race to the bottom). In the US, the US Trustee's
Office, which acts as trustee in liquidation proceedings, serves as a hedge against this kind of
parochialism. The same cannot be said of many other jurisdictions, where administrators are
appointed by creditor's committees. For a comparative study of the appointment process for
debtor-administrators, see generally Lobo, World Insolvency Systems (cited in note 15).

121

See note 17.
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involved with the Dante CDO case pales in comparison to the financial cost of
conflicting rulings that could result if BP, for example, decided to file for
bankruptcy protection in an effort to address unknown-and potentially
overwhelming-obligations from the Gulf disaster. In this section, I explore the
failings of the current framework in the context of the Dante CDO case.
A. Lehman and the Dante CDO
This Comment has alluded to the scope and complexity of the Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy, but only a simplified explanation of Lehman's structure
and the Dante CDO itself is necessary here. 122
1. Basic Lehman
Protocol.

structure

and

shortcomings

of the

Lehman

The main Lehman holding company was incorporated in the US with
operating subsidiaries in numerous countries. However, operating subsidiaries
notwithstanding, cash flowed freely within the company under a highly
integrated cash management system. Accordingly, while there were intracompany debts, these debts were essentially illusory, and they simply represented
the bookkeeping necessary to comply with regulatory and taxation authorities.
Similar systems are common in large, multinational enterprise groups. 123 In
addition to largely illusory intra-company debts, there were elaborate systems of
cross-collateralization and intra-company guarantees of debts to third parties.
The ultimate effect was to ensure that Lehman's creditors were not limited to
the assets of single subsidiaries, unless a subsidiary was established as a special
purpose entity (or bankruptcy remote vehicle, as the case may be).12 4
Judge Peck, the judge in charge of the LBHI proceedings in the US, issued
an early order allowing the enterprise to continue operating under its prepetition cash management system; however, the order did not prohibit the assets
from being frozen by the laws of other jurisdictions.125 The cash management

122

All explanation of the basic Lehman framework in this Section is drawn from the following
sources: McDonald and Robinson, A ColossalFailureof Common Sense (cited in note 3); In re Lehman
Bros Holdings, 2008 WL 4902202 (explaining cash management system); In re Lehman Bros Holdings,
422 Bankr 407 (holding the priority swap provision at issue in the Dante CDO unenforceable);

Tatiana V. Tkachenko, Lehman Brothers'Bankruptcy Proceedings:The EuropeanPerspenive, 2010 Norton
123

Ann Rev Intl Insolvency 304.
See Tkachenko, 19 J Bankr L & Prac at 586-87 (cited in note 5).

124

"Special purpose entities" or "bankruptcy remote vehicles" are subsidiaries established to hold
certain assets that have a different risk portfolio than a company's normal asset portfolios or are
otherwise specialized assets. They are also widely used as entities for cash-management or tax
sheltering purposes. The details of special purpose vehicles are unimportant to this discussion.
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In re Lehman Bros Holdings, 2008 WL 4902202 at *2-3.
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system-and, by extension, the operation of the entire enterprise-was managed
by a corporation whose COMI was undeniably in the US; but because COMI
analysis focuses on the place of incorporation and operation of each member of
the enterprise individually, multiple foreign main proceedings were filed,
including, importantly, the main proceeding for Lehman Brothers International
Europe (LBIE), which controlled most of Lehman's European assets.12
Recognizing a need to coordinate proceedings, the various Lehman
principals engaged in negotiations toward a Protocol of unprecedented scope.'
Most importantly, the Protocol included provisions that served to limit the
scope and targets of avoidance actions and intra-company claims. 12 8 But those
provisions led to the principals of LBIE and Lehman Brothers Japan (LBJ)
refusing to sign the Protocol, which greatly diminished the Protocol's benefit.129
Additionally, LBIE's refusal to sign on to the Protocol angered Judge Peck, who
stated in court that "[t]he position that's being taken by LBIE appears to be
getting in the way of a global initiative." o
The precise results of the refusal of LBIE and LBJ to sign on to the
Protocol are probably unknowable. The most likely result is higher negotiation
and litigation costs relating to information sharing and intra-company claims,
and those figures are very likely to be significant. More generally, the failure
demonstrates the potential inability for a Protocol to handle a large-scale
transnational enterprise insolvency adequately.
2. Dante and the failure of the Model
framework.

Law/EU Regulations

The Dante case illustrates several of the shortcomings of the Model Law
framework. Indeed, neither the UK nor US courts even discussed the
application of the Model Law to the issue at hand, probably because the Model
Law was outside of what proved to be the very narrow reach of the existing

126

Charles D. Booth, et al, Cross-BorderInsolvency 12 (American Bankruptcy Institute 2010), online at
(visited
http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/international/vol7num5/cross.pdf
Oct 16, 2011) (noting that there are now 75 distinct Lehman Brothers insolvency proceedings).

127

See Zumbro, 11 Bus L Intl at 164 (cited in note 16); Tkachenko, 2010 Norton Ann Rev Intl
Insolvency at 315 (cited in note 122) ("Unlike mostly bilateral protocols in the past that have been
between states of common law jurisdictions . . . , this Protocol has sought to coordinate
insolvency proceedings among multiple common law and civil law jurisdictions in various
continental European countries and, for the first time, several countries in Asia.").
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Tkachenko, 2010 Norton Ann Rev Intl Insolvency at 317-18 (cited in note 122).

129

Id at 318 ("The US operations of Lehman Brothers and the UK and European Lehman Brothers'
entities in administration are now being dealt with through separate legal procedures as if they are
no longer part of the same group," quoting LBIE's principal.).

130

Potkewitz, Lehman Bankrupty Hits Stumbling Block (cited in note 59).
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framework as it relates to enterprise groups. Nominally, the parties in interest
were not subject to the Model Law provisions, because the special purpose
vehicles (SPVs) in the Dante program were not themselves in liquidaion-only
the enterprise entities subject to its cross-collateralization provisions were in
liquidation.131 Specifically, the Dante provision was linked to a bankruptcy filing
by LBHI, the main US holding bank.13 2
"Dante" was the name of a Lehman SPV program, whose assets included a
variety of derivatives contracts.3 ' A third-party custodian, Bank of New York
Mellon, held legal title of Dante's assets and had disbursement responsibilities.'3 4
The contracts setting up the Dante vehicle had choice-of-law clauses, which
stated that UK law was to apply to any dispute or interpretative question.13 5
The Dante program was supposed to be "bankruptcy remote" from the
main Lehman holdings. In other words, the guarantee network itself was
somewhat independent from the overall cash management system of the
enterprise." 6 Nevertheless, the catastrophic nature of Lehman's collapse pulled
in most of Lehman's SPVs, and the Dante entities were no exception. 3 7
At issue in both the UK and US litigation was a contract provision that
shifted payment priority upon the bankruptcy of certain members of the
The UK high court found that the provision was
enterprise group.'"
enforceable, while the US court found that the provision violated the bankruptcy
code's prohibition against ipso facto clauses; the opposing rulings led to
inconsistent recoveries (in the UK litigation, the noteholders recovered, while
Lehman recovered in the US litigation).' The prohibition against ipso facto
clauses is considered a fundamental public policy of US bankruptcy, which is
why the court declined to honor the UK court's decision and the UK choice of

131

See Dan Schechter, Debtor's PrepetitionLoss of Priority UnderSpringing SubordinationAgreement Trggered
by Parent Corporation's Bankruptiy Filing Is Unenforceable Ipso Facto Provision, 2010 Comm Fin
Newsletter 16 (2010).

132

See id.

133

See In re Lehman Bros Holdings, 422 Bankr at 413.

134

PepeealTrustee Co Ltd, 2009 EWHC 1912.

135

See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Comment on UniversalProceduraksm, 48 Colurn
512-13 (2010).

136

Id.
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See In re Lehman Bros Holdings, 2008 WL 4902202 at *2; In re Lehman Bros Holdings, 422 Bankr at
411.
See Schechter, 2010 Comm Fin News 16 (cited in note 131).

138
139

J Transnatl L 503,

In re Lehman Bros Holdings, 422 Bankr at 412. The court also held that various exceptions in the
bankruptcy code did not apply; that discussion is not relevant to this Comment. Ipso facto clauses
are clauses that give specific economic consequences to insolvency.

836

Vol. 12 No. 2

Administration of TransnationalInsolvendes Involving Enterprise Groups

Sexton

law provision in the contract. 14 While the public policy analysis in the Dante
case was done under a comity analysis instead of under the Model Law,
fundamental public policy analysis is similar under both the comity and Model
Law lenses.' 4 1
3. Concluding remarks on the Lehman case study and future
considerations.
Many of the successes and failures of the transnational framework in the
context of the Lehman bankruptcy are likely to be unknowable. The Lehman
Protocol, signed by Judge Peck, gave the administrator of LBHI broad authority
to settle claims without further accounting by the court. It is impossible to know
precisely what impact the Protocol's provisions had on negotiation of various
intra-company claims and how those negotiations interplayed with the court
proceedings involving third-party creditors. Similarly, the Lehman case has not
progressed far enough to know the litigation and transaction costs resulting
from the failure of Lehman's US broker-dealer, LBJ, and LBIE to sign on to the
Protocol.
We do know the concrete consequences that resulted from application of
the same public policy analysis that permeates application of the Model Law:
conflicting rulings. Though the Dante case itself ultimately settled out of court
due to pressure from the UK and US courts,142 Simlarly conflicting rulings could
happen in the future.
What is remarkable about the failures in the Lehman case is that, despite its
massive scope, all the pieces of the transnational insolvency framework were in
place, and yet the failures still occurred. The US and UK have both enacted
legislation implementing the Model Law and have similar legal systems. Lehman
is in liquidation; there are no concerns about preserving enterprise value on a
going-concern basis and no conflicts between domestic insolvency systems that
generally do not contemplate reorganization and those that do. There was no
conflict between tort creditors and financial creditors. For those reasons, the
failures in the Lehman case are instructive on what could happen if, for example,
BP were to file for insolvency protection to handle certain aspects of the Gulf
disaster.143
140

See id at 417-18 (noting that courts will not adhere to the principle of comity where doing so
would violate a fundamental public policy in the US bankruptcy code).

141 See id at 416. See also Section II.C.
142

See Schechter, 2010 Comm Fin News 16 (cited in note 131).

143

This is a realistic possibility. See Jason Kilborn, The Mother of All Cress-Border Bankrupties? (Credit
at http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2010/06/the-mother-of-allSlips 2010), online
crossborder-bankruptcies.htnl (visited Oct 16, 2011) (discussing the possibility of a BP
insolvency petition).
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IV. BRIEF PROPOSALS TO ADDRESS CERTAIN SHORTCOMINGS
OF THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK
The primary purpose of this Comment is to explain the current framework
of transnational insolvencies, identify the most glaring weaknesses, and
demonstrate the resulting problems. In this section, I briefly propose two
approaches courts working within the current framework should employ in
order to minimize the potential for conflicting court rulings and inefficiencies
resulting from the failure to adopt Protocols under certain circumstances. These
proposals are designed to lead toward a "new lex mercatoria" for the most
important issues of transnational insolvency.1 "
A. Greater Use of Substantive Consolidation for the Limited
Purpose of Applying the Center of Main Interest Test
As discussed in connection with the Model Law and EU Regulations, the
primary weakness in the current framework is its failure to account for corporate
enterprise groups that have operating assets in multiple jurisdictions but have
highly integrated structures. Under those circumstances, multiple main
proceedings will be opened-one for each portion of the enterprise group with
operating assets sufficient to justify the opening of a proceeding. This has two
inevitable results: (i) COMI determinations for each operating subsidiary do not
adequately account for the centralized cash-management systems of integrated
groups; and (ii) conflicting COMI determinations with respect to operating
subsidiaries are likely, as some jurisdictions (following the US example) will
account for actual operations, while other jurisdictions (following the European
example) will employ a presumption that the place of incorporation or
registration is the COMI of the corporate group.
In order to get around this problem, courts should take a cue from US
bankruptcy law. Under US law, the insolvency proceedings of corporate
enterprise groups are proceduraly consolidated into one proceeding. 4 5

144

New lex mercatoria is an evolving legal philosophy dealing with private international law
generally, and it argues that the current private international law framework does not adequately
account for the business needs of transnational commerce. Interestingly, the development of new
lex mercatoria theory has focused on the commercial dealings of solvent companies, even though
all dealings of solvent companies occur in the shadow of insolvency. The exploration of the
potential application of new lex mercatoria theory to transnational insolvency is not the subject of
this Comment. For a description of new lex mercatoria theory, see generally Klaus Peter Berger,
The Creeping Codification ofthe New Lex Mercatoria(Kluwer L Intl 2d ed 2010).

145

See, for example, Timothy E. Gaulich, Substantive Consolidaon-A Post-Modem Trend, 14 Am
Bankr Inst L Rev 527, 529 (2006) (explaining substantive consolidation and contrasting it with
procedural consolidation).
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Additionally, in circumstances where the individually incorporated entities are, in
fact, incapable of being unwound from the main operating company, courts will
employ substantive consolidation.14 6 In those circumstances, intra-company
transfers are ignored, the assets of the entire enterprise group are considered
together, and priorities among the third-party creditors of the various
subsidiaries are blended. Full substantive consolidation in the transnational
insolvency context would be both impossible and undesirable because
substantively consolidating proceedings that are governed by different
substantive laws is difficult even where the laws are closely related. However, for
the purposes of determining the COMI of a transnational business enterprise
group, conducting a hypothetical substantive consolidation-that is, taking a look
at the entire enterprise-would allow courts to open fewer main proceedings.
Based on combined transaction structures and operating assets, courts could
open main proceedings only in those locations where a main proceeding is truly
necessary to maximize the value of the enterprise as a whole and to
accommodate differences in substantive law.
This limited proposal differs significantly from the full substantive
consolidation considered (and rejected) by Working Group V because I do not
argue that, after consolidation for purposes of determining COMI, the walls
separating the various enterprise groups should be pulled down. Instead, I use
the concept of substantive consolidation in order to shine a light on what the true
COMI of various constituents in the corporate enterprise actually are. Such an
approach not affect priorities in payment or grant new substantive rights, and
would preserve the expectations of creditors by ensuring the application of the
insolvency law where the debtor-enterprise actually does business, as opposed to
the various insolvency laws of disparate cites of incorporation where the
creditors' money eventually lands.
B. Insistence by Model Law Courts That Adoption of a
Protocol Be a Prerequisite to Obtaining the Procedural
Benefits Inherent in the Model Law
Currently, many provisions of the Model Law and EU Regulations
anticipate that various principals will seek to enter Protocols. However, Model
Law Courts, until now, have not required that principals do so in order to obtain
the benefits from the Model Law and EU Regulations.
I propose utilizing the public policy exception broadly in this instance. The
public policy of all domestic insolvency regimes is the maximization of value.
Although domestic regimes contain differences respecting the disbursement of
146
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that value, all constituents-creditors, employees, and communities-benefit
when insolvency proceedings maximize the size of the pie. Protocols are
designed to work in concert with the provisions of the Model Law and EU
Regulations, as well as with general principles of comity, in non-EU jurisdictions
that have not enacted the Model Law in order to maximize value, mainly by
limiting needless transaction costs. Thus, refusal to enter a Protocol serves a
blow to the overall value of the business enterprise-a reality made clear in the
Lehman case.
Accordingly, courts, acting under the public policy exception, should refuse
to recognize principals who have failed to give adequate cause for refusing to
enter Protocols. This would allow Model Law Courts, as well as courts working
under more general principles of comity, to leverage the Protocol process to
maximize the value of the entire enterprise group. Importantly, this proposal
acknowledges the emphasis that Working Group V has placed on Protocols as
the only feasible way to coordinate and control large-scale transnational
enterprise insolvencies.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Significant progress has been made in the theory and practice of
transnational insolvency in the last twenty years. But as globalization continues
to lead to integrated transnational enterprise groups, the potential for
insolvencies similar to Lehman will continue to grow. Accordingly, the current
frameworks must continue to evolve. The proposals of Working Group V may
lead to improvement, but they fall short of allowing for a logical liquidation or
reorganization proceeding for distressed transnational enterprise groups.
Therefore, courts will need to continue to employ their own creativity in
addressing these issues. By engaging in a hypothetical substantive consolidation
to provide more "teeth" to the COMI analysis and by utilizing the public policy
exception to force otherwise recalcitrant principals to sign on to Protocols, the
courts will be able to handle more effectively the difficult questions that arise in
this context.
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